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The theory of fiscal competition seeks to ascertain how fiscal policymaking is affected by 
competitive pressures faced by governments. This requires a theory of policy choice, and, as 
such, the theory of fiscal competition lies squarely in the realm of political economy. This essay 
presents a concise overview of some of the principal themes that have figured prominently in 
economic analyses of fiscal competition and identifies significant gaps that warrant further 
attention and that may occupy the attention of investigators in the years to come.   It first sketches 
a model that has been used frequently in theoretical and empirical analyses of fiscal competition, 
emphasizing how fiscal policies affect the welfare (real incomes) of various groups and how these 
impacts depend on the mobility of resources. Subsequent sections address parts of the subject that 
are less well-settled, highlighting, for example,  the fact that  exit (or entry) options for mobile  
resources alters the payoffs from alternative fiscal policies among those who participate actively 
in the  political process and, thus, participation incentives. 
 
Two intertemporal aspects of fiscal competition are emphasized: the determination of the 
“degree” of factor mobility, especially for the purposes of empirical analysis, and the issue of 
time-varying policies, commitment, and dynamic consistency.   The paper also discusses the role 
of institutions, and particularly of higher- and lower-level governments (i.e., the vertical and 
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1   Introduction  
   
Analyses of fiscal competition seek to ascertain how fiscal policymaking is affected by 
competitive pressures faced by governments.  Such analyses may be useful for normative 
evaluation, but, at base, the theory of fiscal competition requires a theory of policy 
choice. As such, it lies squarely in the realm of political economy. Does this theory have 
any operationally-meaningful content? Does it offer useful guidance for empirical 
analysis?  As will become clear, the answers to these questions are definitely "yes": 
models of governments operating in a competitive environment typically predict policy 
outcomes different from those chosen by governments not facing competition.  This is a 
far cry from saying that these implications are readily testable, however.  At the most 
fundamental level, there is no settled operational basis on which to determine whether or 
to what degree any set of governments can be said to “compete”, or whether the extent of 
competition has changed over time. The development of empirical tests for the effects of 
fiscal competition is an area of ongoing research, and will no doubt remain so for some 
time to come.     
 
To help readers get their bearings in a rapidly-developing branch of literature, this essay 
presents a concise overview of some of the principal themes that have figured 
prominently in economic analyses of fiscal competition.
1  In addition to surveying some 
of the contours of existing research, I also try to identify significant gaps that warrant 
further attention and that may occupy the attention of investigators in the years to come.     
 
What Is Fiscal Competition?     
 
The term “fiscal competition” may evoke images of one state pitted in a contest with 
another for a high-stakes manufacturing project, with politicians serving up juicy 
packages of tax holidays, infrastructure projects, regulatory relief, and direct subsidies to 
entice a firm and advance the cause of “economic development,” “jobs,” or other 
supposedly desirable economic outcomes.  However, events of this sort, sometimes rich 
in political drama, are not the only form of fiscal competition, just as the tales of buyouts, 
takeovers, and boardroom struggles that crowd the business pages are only one part of the 
process of commercial competition among business firms.   The numerous producers in 
the wheat or corn industries, each reacting to market conditions that they cannot 
individually influence, are textbook examples of perfect competition in a market setting.  
Perfect competition, in a market context, limits the power of individual producers to 
affect market prices, creates  powerful incentives to control costs and to respond to 
fluctuating market conditions, limits profits only to those pure rents that arise from the 
ownership of unique and non-replicable assets, and produces efficient allocations of 
resources in an otherwise undistorted economy.  This type of market competition differs 
markedly from the rivalrous behavior that sometimes characterizes much more 
concentrated industries, in which a handful of captains of industry wheel and deal to 
snuff out, or perhaps to buy out, one or two other major competitors and thus secure 
market dominance.  Textbook perfect competition deals with the rather more routine 
business of providing regular supplies of goods and services to numerous small 
customers who, though unable to dictate terms to any one supplier, can always turn to 
numerous competing suppliers.    
 
                                                 
1 There are several literature surveys that interested readers may consult.  These include Cremer et al. 
(1996), Wildasin (1998), Wilson (1999), Wilson and Wildasin (2004). Many key ideas can be found in 
Oates (1968).   2
                                                
Similarly, fiscal competition occurs, in its purest and probably most important form, in 
the routine daily decisions of numerous and usually small businesses, workers, 
consumers, and governments. To be sure, fiscal competition, like market competition, can 
certainly be investigated in cases of “imperfect competition,” where governments, market 
agents (like firms), or both, are small in number and large in size. The analysis of 
strategic interactions among small numbers of large agents -- small numbers of 
governments, small numbers of firms, or small numbers of both -- forms a rich and 
interesting branch of the literature on fiscal competition, but the case of  perfect 
competition is always a useful and even essential benchmark.  In order to limit its scope, 
most of the discussion in this essay focuses on this benchmark “perfectly competitive” 
case in which many small governments compete for many small households and firms.  
In doing so, game-theoretic complexities arising from strategic interactions among 
governments are de-emphasized -- undoubtedly a significant limitation in some contexts.
2
 
Competition among governments can take many forms.  The present essay focuses just 
on those aspects of competition that arise from the (actual or potential) movement of 
productive resources -- especially labor and capital, in their many forms -- across 
jurisdictional boundaries.  This type of fiscal competition is of great importance because 
the revenues of fiscal systems so often depend critically on the incomes accruing to 
capital and labor (or their correlates, including consumption) and their expenditures are 
so often linked to labor and capital (or their demographic and economic correlates, 
including populations and subpopulations of all ages).  However, it should be kept in 
mind that competition may also result from trade in goods and services or simply from 
the flow of information among jurisdictions, as discussed in other branches of literature.  
In practice, these many types of competition should be expected to occur simultaneously. 
Analyses of these different types of competition are potentially complementary and are 
certainly not mutually exclusive.     
 
Outline     
 
This paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 discusses the basic economics of fiscal 
competition.  Section 2.1 sketches a model that has been used frequently in theoretical 
and empirical analyses of fiscal competition, emphasizing how fiscal policies affect the 
welfare (real incomes) of various groups and how these impacts depend on the mobility 
of resources and thus providing the economic foundation for subsequent discussion. 
Section 2.2 shows how alternative versions of this model allow it to be exploited in 
diverse application contexts.  The normative implications of fiscal competition are 
discussed briefly in Section 2.3.   
 
Subsequent sections of the paper address parts of the subject that are less well-settled.  
Section 3 focuses on the political economy of  fiscal competition, highlight the fact that 
exit (or entry) options for mobile  resources alters the payoffs from alternative fiscal 
policies among those who  (rationally, under the circumstances) participate actively in the  
political process  Section 4 analyzes two intertemporal aspects of fiscal competition: the 
determination of the “degree” of factor mobility, especially for the purposes of empirical 
analysis, and the issue of time-varying policies, commitment, and dynamic consistency.   
Finally, Section 5 turns to the role of institutions, and particularly of higher- and lower-
level governments (i.e., the vertical and horizontal structure of government), in fiscal 
competition.  Section 6 concludes.     
 
 
2 Brueckner (2000, 2003) surveys both the basic theory and the empirical testing of models of  strategic 
fiscal competition in several different contexts.    3
2  Models of Fiscal Competition: From Simple to Complex     
 
Perhaps the most frequently utilized model of tax competition is one in which there is a 
single mobile factor of production, usually called “capital”, that is the single source of 
revenue for a government that provides a single public good or service.  Capital mobility 
implies that heavier taxation will drive capital to other jurisdictions, creating incentives 
for the government to limit the local tax burden.  Since capital taxation is the sole source 
of local government revenue, capital mobility limits government expenditure. 
 
In this model, competition for mobile capital may lead to underprovision of public 
services (sometimes described, with excessive rhetorical flourish, as a “race to the 
bottom”) and can be harmful to economic welfare.  At least, this can be true if public 
expenditures are used by benevolent local political decisionmakers to provide public 
services valued by local residents -- in the simplest case, by a single representative local 
resident.  If, by contrast, self-interested politicians use government expenditure 
inefficiently -- e.g., to overstaff the public sector, to overcompensate public-sector 
workers, or to make sweetheart deals with the friends of corrupt officials -- then capital 
mobility, by limiting public expenditures, also limits waste, e.g. by “Leviathans” 
(Brennan and Buchanan (1980); see also Keen and Kotsogiannis (1993)).  In this case, 
the welfare implications of capital mobility are ambiguous and it is possible that mobility 
of the tax base may be welfare-improving.     
 
As will be seen, it is easy to sketch a model in which these ideas can be developed more 
formally.  However, it should already be apparent that simple “bottom line” conclusions 
about the implications of “tax competition,” such as the two opposing conclusions 
contained in the preceding paragraph (to state them as simply as possible, “tax 
competition puts downward pressure on public expenditures and is welfare-harmful” and 
“tax competition puts downward pressure on public expenditures and is welfare-
improving”), rest on equally simple and highly debatable hypotheses.  These hypotheses, 
when stated explicitly, are clearly anything but self-evident.  In fact, it is possible to 
construct an entire series of models of fiscal competition that yield a wide range of 
positive and normative implications.  As already suggested by the emphases in the 
preceding paragraphs, different assumptions may be made about the types of fiscal 
instruments utilized by governments, the number of fiscal instruments that they use, the 
underlying local economic structure (such as the type and number of mobile  productive 
resources), and the type and number of agents  in whose interest(s) policies are 
formulated.  The present essay cannot provide an exhaustive enumeration of all possible 
models of fiscal competition.  However, equipped with a basic model, built on standard 
assumptions, it is relatively easy to see how the implications of fiscal competition can 
vary widely as critical assumptions are altered.  
 
2.1  A Benchmark Model     
 
The literature on fiscal competition owes much to the study of local government finance 
in the US.  It is worth recalling a few basic facts about these governments.  First, they are 
numerous and, generally,  small: there are about 90,000 local governments, including 
more than  3,000 counties, about 14,000 school districts, more than 20,000  
municipalities, and tens of thousands of special districts and  townships.  Local education 
spending accounts for about 40% of all local public expenditures (about half of all 
expenditures excluding public utility expenditures).  Local property taxes account for 
about two-thirds of all local tax revenues.  Historically, the local property tax has been, 
by far, the dominant element in local fiscal systems; even today, when many local 
governments have broadened their tax systems, it accounts for about 72% of local  4
government own-source tax revenue.  Because property taxes have played such a 
dominant role as a source of local government revenues in the US, and because education 
accounts for such a large part of local government spending, numerous early 
contributions to the literature on fiscal competition build upon the stylized assumption 
that governments use a single tax instrument to finance a single public service.     
 
Modern studies of property tax incidence (that is, of the real economic burden of the 
property tax) provide much of the analytical foundation for the study of fiscal 
competition.  The property tax is commonly viewed partly as a tax assessed on “raw” 
land and partly as a tax on the structures built on land.  Land, per se, is perfectly 
inelastically supplied, but all of the other value of property -- perhaps 90% of the value of 
residential, commercial, and industrial property, in a modern urban setting -- derives from 
investment in its improvement and development.  These capital investments are durable 
resources that, while fixed in the short run (residential subdivisions, shopping malls, or 
industrial parks cannot be created instantaneously, and, once built, only depreciate 
gradually), are variable in the long run.  A conventional view is that the burden of local 
property taxes falls on property owners in the short run because the supplies of both land 
and capital are inelastic.  In the long run, however, the property tax discourages 
investment in the local economy, resulting in reduced local economic activity and lower 
returns to land or other fixed local resources, possibly including labor.  Because of  the 
quantitative importance of capital relative to land and because  the variability of capital in 
the long run plays a critical role in  the analysis of tax incidence, much of the literature on 
local  property taxation simply ignores the land component of the property  tax, treating it 
simply as a local tax on capital investment.     
 
Figure 1 illustrates this model. Let k represent the amount of capital investment in the 
local economy.  In the long run, this is determined by the profitability of local investment 
relative to investment opportunities elsewhere.  The MPK schedule shows the before-tax 
or gross rate of return on capital in the locality, based on its marginal productivity.  
Because capital combines with land, labor, or other immobile resources, this schedule is 
downward-sloping, reflecting the idea that investments are very profitable when there is 
almost no capital in the local economy but that successive units of investment are 
decreasingly profitable as the local capital stock expands.  If r* is the net rate of return on 
investment elsewhere in the economy, and if there were no local property tax or other 
local policies that would influence investment, k* would be the long-run equilibrium 
level of the local capital stock because the return on capital in the local economy would 
be just equal to the return earned elsewhere and there would therefore be no incentive for 
capital to flow into or out of the locality.  The total value of local economic activity -- all 
production of goods and services, including the rental value of residential property -- is 
represented by the area 0ABk*, of which the amount 0r*Bk* is the return accruing to 
capital invested in the local economy and the remainder, r*AB, is the income earned by 
local landowners, workers, or owners of other local resources.    
 
If the capital stock is fixed at k* in the short run and a local property tax is imposed, 
collecting t per unit of capital, the owners of local capital would suffer a loss in net 
income as the net rate of return falls to r* - t.  This is not a long-run equilibrium, 
however, since more profitable investments, earning r*, are available outside the locality. 
Over time, the local capital stock would shrink to k', at which point the gross or before-
tax rate of return in the local economy would have risen to r', that is, by the amount of the 
local tax t.  With this higher local before-tax rate of return, the local net rate of return is 
equal to that available externally.  In this post-tax situation, local production will have 
been reduced to 0ACk'.  The outflow of capital reduces the gross income of land, labor, or 
other local resources to r'AC while the local government raises r* r'CB in tax revenues.   5
                                                
If the entirety of this tax revenue is paid over to landowners or workers, either in cash or 
in the form of public services equal in value to the amount of tax revenue, their loss of 
income will be partly but not completely offset. On balance, they will lose the amount 
DCB in net income, that is, the collection of revenue through this tax is costly, on net, to 
local residents.  To express this observation in a slightly different terminology, the (local) 
“marginal cost of public funds” is greater than 1, that is, local residents suffer more than 
$1 in loss for every dollar of tax revenue raised.  In still other language, the (local) 
“marginal excess burden” of the local tax is positive.     
 
Within the context of this simple model, a local tax on capital has very different 
consequences, depending on whether capital is immobile (identified here as the “short 
run”) or mobile (the “long run”).  To summarize the essential points:     
 
(i)  In the short run, the stock of capital within a locality is fixed. The imposition 
of a tax on capital, such as a local property tax, does not affect the real resources 
available within the locality or the real output and income generated by those 
resources.  It does reduce the net rate of return to the owners of the local capital 
stock, and thus their incomes.  
    
(ii)  In the long run, a local property tax cannot reduce the net return to capital, either 
inside or outside of the locality
3 (because capital flows into or out of the locality 
so as to equalize internal and external net rates of return).  Hence, the net incomes 
of capital owners of capital are not (significantly) affected by the local tax.     
 
(iii)   The local property tax does affect the owners of immobile resources within 
the jurisdiction, such as landowners or perhaps workers.  The tax-driven reduction 
in the stock of capital reduces the demand for complementary factors of 
production and reduces their gross or before-tax returns.     
 
(iv)   The loss of income to the immobile resource owners exceeds the amount of 
tax revenue collected.  This means that the tax is harmful to them, on balance, if it 
is used merely to finance transfer payments or other expenditures that are no more 
valuable than their cost. As a corollary, the only expenditures that will benefit 
local residents are those whose benefits exceed their direct cost. 
 
So far, this analysis merely illustrates the effects of hypothetical policies without 
addressing the political economy of policy choice.  But because it shows how different 
groups are affected by alternative policies, its potential lessons for politics are immediate.  
In particular, it shows how the mobility of a taxed resource changes the impact of fiscal 
policies on different groups, and thus on their incentives to influence the political 
process.     
 
Assume for the moment that the local political process chooses policies that maximize 
the incomes of owners of resources other than capital -- workers, say, or landowners. 
(Perhaps local residents elect politicians who pursue this goal on their behalf.)  In the 
short run, a local tax on capital provides an opportunity for these agents to capture rents 
from the owners of capital -- unless of course the capital is owned entirely by these 
agents themselves, in which case a tax on capital is just a tax on themselves.  Provided, 
however, that  there is some “foreign ownership” of capital, the local property tax  is an 
 
3 More precisely, a local property tax does not perceptibly affect the net rate of return outside of the 
locality. 
  6
attractive revenue instrument with which to finance local public  services like schools.  It 
can even provide a tool to transfer rents from capital owners to workers or landowners 
via direct cash transfers or equivalent in-kind public expenditures.  From a long run 
perspective, however, the local economy has to compete for capital, and the incentive for 
local residents to use this tax to capture rents for themselves changes dramatically: in 
fact, it disappears altogether.     
 
To forestall possible confusion, note that it is still possible to tax capital in the long run, 
even though it is freely mobile, and to use it to generate tax revenue. Mobility of the tax 
base does not mean that taxes cause the entire tax base to disappear; in Figure 1, the 
capital stock only shrinks to k', not 0, due to the tax, and the tax produces revenue equal 
to r'CDr*. Mobility of capital does imply, however, that the economic burden of the tax 
on capital does not fall on the owners of capital, who must, in equilibrium, earn the  same 
net rate of return r* within the locality as without.  Instead, the real burden of the tax now 
falls on the owners of land, labor, and other immobile resources, even though the tax is 
not imposed on these agents.  The economic incidence of the tax is shifted from the 
owners of capital to the owners of resources that are “trapped” within the locality and 
cannot escape the burden of taxation.  From a long-run perspective, the latter have no 
incentive to tax property in order to capture rents from the former. Indeed, a tax on 
capital that is used to finance transfers to the owners of locally-fixed resources is not only 
not advantageous to them; on balance, it is harmful, because of the “deadweight loss” of 
the tax.  This loss is absorbed by local residents -- landowners or workers -- in the form 
of reduced land rents or wages resulting from the flow of capital investment out of the 
local economy.  If local residents must use the property tax to finance public service 
provision, they have an incentive to limit these services because raising local tax 
revenues is costly to them.  They may end up providing lower levels of public services 
than would be true if they could, instead, use a tax on land rents or wages.     
 
This discussion has relied on a series of highly stylized assumptions and a very simple 
model.  In a stark form, it shows how the owners of immobile resources end up bearing 
the burden of local taxes imposed on mobile resources, including any (local) deadweight 
loss or excess burden associated with local taxes.  This is true even if the owners of the 
immobile resources are not directly affected by the local tax.  Likewise, capital mobility 
protects the owners of mobile capital from having to bear the burden of any local taxes 
imposed upon them.  In  this model, politicians acting on behalf of “immobile local  
residents” -- landowners or workers -- would not wish to impose taxes on mobile capital, 
even if the owners of this capital are outsiders with no voice whatsoever in local politics.     
 
2.2  Further Interpretations and Applications of the Basic Model     
 
These observations have important implications for the political economy of public 
policy.  Before discussing these implications, however, let us pause to consider some 
variations on the very simple model developed above.     
 
First, as we have seen, a tax on mobile capital that is used to finance transfer payments to 
local landowners or workers ends up harming the recipients of these payments, on net, by 
an amount equal  to the excess burden from the tax on capital.  They would therefore 
prefer a zero tax rate on capital to any positive tax.  They would not, however, wish to 
subsidize capital investment, if they had to pay the taxes required to finance these 
subsidies. This policy, which is the reverse of a tax on capital used to finance transfer 
payments to the owners of immobile resources, is also harmful to the latter.  It would 
attract capital and thus increase the level of  before-tax income accruing to immobile 
resources (the size of the  triangle in Figure 1) but this increased income would be more  7
                                                
than  offset by the taxes needed to finance the investment subsidy: in other  words, this 
policy, too, creates an excess burden to be absorbed by  local residents.  If a tax or 
subsidy on capital investment merely involves offsetting transfers of cash (or its 
equivalent) to the owners of immobile resources, it imposes a net burden on them; from 
their viewpoint, such a policy should be eliminated.  Competition for mobile capital does 
not imply that local governments will seek to subsidize capital investment.     
 
Second, although the basic model can be applied to the analysis of property taxes levied 
by local school districts in the US, nothing prevents its application to different types of 
tax or expenditure policies undertaken by higher-level governments. For instance, 
corporation income taxes are often viewed as source-based taxes on the income produced 
by business investment.  These taxes are often imposed by state, provincial, and national 
governments. The benchmark model suggests that such taxes may impose net burdens on 
the incomes of corporations, and thus their owners, in the short run, but that their long-
run burden falls on the owners of other, less mobile resources.  Thus, the same model that 
has been used to analyze the taxation of property by local governments within a single 
country can also be used to analyze the taxation of business income by countries in an 
international context.   
 
Third, although the mobile resource in the discussion so far has been called “capital”, it 
should be clear that it is the mobility of the taxed or subsidized resource relative to other, 
immobile local resources that matters for the analysis.  Depending on the context, the 
(potentially) mobile resource could also be people.  In this case, the model shows that the 
real net income of mobile households is not affected by local fiscal policies, in the long 
run.  A local tax on the incomes of the rich, for instance, would reduce their net incomes 
in the short run but, if they can move freely to other jurisdictions in the long run, the 
burden of such a tax would eventually fall on other, less mobile resources within the 
taxing jurisdiction.     
 
Fourth, although the taxing powers of local school districts in the US are often limited, 
both by law (for instance, a state constitution or statute may prohibit them from imposing 
any taxes other than a property tax) and by their limited capacity to administer income or 
other relatively complex taxes, higher-level governments, such as states, provinces, and 
nations, commonly have much more revenue autonomy and administrative capacity.  On 
the expenditure side, higher-level governments can and do provide a wide array of public 
goods and services. Thus, although school districts in the US may plausibly be described 
as jurisdictions that utilize a single tax (on property) to finance a single type of public 
good (primary and secondary education), most governments have many more fiscal 
policy instruments at their disposal.  In such a context, the mobility of a single resource, 
such as capital, may result in a lower tax on that resource, but this need not imply a 
reduction in government spending; instead, it may mean that other sources of revenues 
are utilized more heavily.  That is, fiscal competition may result not in less government 
spending but in a different structure of taxation, as governments substitute away from 
taxation of mobile resources and rely more heavily on taxation of less-mobile resources 
(Bucovetsky and Wilson (1991)).
4   
 
Fifth, as a corollary of the preceding observation, note that fiscal competition may lead to 
higher public expenditures.  In the simple model of Figure 1, there is only one fiscal 
 
4 As one simple illustration of this possibility, note that few governments tax highly liquid financial assets 
such as bank account balances.  When imposed, these taxes are usually levied at very low rates and they 
generate only modest revenues by comparison with taxes on household incomes, consumption, or fixed 
assets.  This type of tax mix is readily understandable as a consequence of fiscal competition.  8
instrument, a tax, that is applied to mobile capital.  Often, however, government 
expenditures for public transportation, water, power, waste disposal, and other 
infrastructure may raise, rather than lower, the return to capital investment These 
expenditures may partially offset, or even more than offset, the negative impact of taxes 
on capital investment.I  It is the combined impact of all fiscal policies, positive and 
negative, that affect the location of capital or other mobile resources.  The key message 
of the simple basic model is that fiscal competition provides incentives to reduce the net 
fiscal burden on a mobile resource; in practice, this may occur through tax reductions,  
subsidies that offset taxes, higher expenditures on selected public  services that attract 
mobile resources, or possibly through even more complex policy bundles.     
 
Finally, the simple model focuses on extreme polar cases in which one resource or 
another is either completely immobile or freely mobile, possibly depending on the time 
horizon under consideration (the “short run” or “long run”).  Some resources, like 
mineral deposits, natural harbors, or rivers may truly be immobile.  Most other resources, 
like labor, capital, or cash in bank accounts are at  least potentially mobile but are 
seldom, if ever, truly costlessly mobile.  Exactly how to determine the degree of resource 
mobility is not obvious, an issue that is discussed again in Section 4 below.  In general 
terms, however, the fact that the extreme polar assumptions of the simple model are 
violated merely means that its predictions are expected only to be approximately rather 
than literally true.  
 
In summary, the benchmark model of fiscal competition sketched in Section 2.1 lends 
itself to many variations and alternative interpretations, allowing it to be applied in a 
wide variety of contexts.  Models of this type can thus be (and have been) used to study 
such  diverse issues as welfare competition among US states, competition for highly-
skilled or educated, competition for young workers, competition for old workers, or the 
effects of increased labor mobility in Europe resulting  from successive expansions of EU 
membership or the prospective  accession of still more countries -- all in addition to  the 




2.3 Normative Implications of Fiscal Competition     
 
The normative implications of fiscal competition warrant at least brief mention.  Early 
contributions to the literature on fiscal competition highlighted its potential benefits for 
economic efficiency as well as the constraints that it imposes on redistribution.  Tiebout 
(1956) suggests that the sorting of people among localities (i.e., competition among 
localities for mobile households) could improve the efficiency of public expenditures.  
People with high demands for public services would be drawn to localities with high 
levels of public services and high levels of taxation, while low demanders would 
gravitate to localities with low taxes and low spending.  Stigler (1957) argues that the 
mobility of resources limits the capacity of governments to redistribution income.  A 
locality may tax the rich to subsidize the poor (in cash or in kind), but this policy will not 
effectively reduce the net incomes of the rich, nor raise the net income of the poor, if 
either or both groups are freely mobile. 
 
These two ideas are related.  Insofar as competition limits redistributive policies, it leads 
to public expenditures that are closely matched to taxes. Closer alignment between taxes 
and expenditures can result in greater efficiency of resource allocation.  In the context of 
local public schooling in the US, competition among  jurisdictions for mobile households 
would be expected to lead to an  equilibrium in which educational quality and  9
expenditures vary among  localities, with high-demanders grouped in high-tax 
jurisdictions with  good schools and low-demanders grouped in low-tax jurisdictions with  
poor schools.  This equilibrium, in which the benefits and costs and costs of education are 
closely matched, may well be more efficient than one with no mobility of households.  
Given the abundant empirical evidence that education is a normal good (i.e., people 
demand more of it as their incomes rise), this equilibrium is also one in which children 
from rich families receive better educations than those from poor families.  The same 
competitive forces that contribute to efficiency also preclude redistribution from rich to 
poor. Thus, the efficiency and equity effects of fiscal policy cannot, in general, be cleanly 
separated.   
 
3 Fiscal Competition: Exit and Voice     
 
Political decisions involve the resolution of conflicting interests.  The mobility of labor, 
capital, or other resources is relevant for the analysis of political economy because it 
affects the payoffs to alternative fiscal policies, and thus the nature and extent of conflict.  
The Hirschman (1970) distinction between “voice” and “exit” provides a convenient 
lexicon with which to describe the key observations.     
 
First, the payoffs to owners of resources that are truly freely mobile are unaffected by the 
policy choices of small jurisdictions.  On the one hand, they are not adversely affected by 
local policies because they have an exit option: by relocating elsewhere, they can enjoy 
the same level of real income as is available externally.  On the other hand, they cannot 
benefit from local policies, either, because others can enter from outside the jurisdiction 
to take advantage of the same benefits, and will have incentives to do so until those 
benefits are dissipated. The owners of freely-mobile resources thus have no incentive to 
participate in or to influence the local political process, i.e., to exercise “voice”.  In one 
sense, they exert substantial power in the local political process: they do not need to 
defend their interests through voting, lobbying, or any other form of political action 
because market forces “do all the work” for them.  In another sense, they are powerless: 
even full control over local policymaking does them no good.  For the owners of truly 
immobile resources, the story is reversed.  They have (by definition) no exit option: their 
resources are trapped in the local economy.  For these agents, “voice” is essential.  These 
agents do stand to gain or lose, depending on the outcome of the local political process.     
 
To illustrate: consider the influences that may be brought to bear on  policymaking in a 
town or city that is part of a major metropolitan  area, and how this may depend on such 
factors as demographic structure  and the form of housing tenure.  One can imagine a city 
in which most residents are relatively young single people who rent their dwellings.  
Suppose that these dwellings, and the land on which they are situated, are owned by large 
real estate developers: individuals or businesses whose incomes depend on the 
profitability of local real estate investments. The people involved in these real estate 
activities may or may not reside in the city, but in any case have a powerful incentive to 
influence local policies in ways that improve the profitability of the real estate sector.  
One way to do this is to  support taxes on real estate that are used to provide public 
services  that are highly valued by renters, or to urge the restructuring of  public 
expenditures toward services valued by renters, while limiting  taxes and expenditures 
that are devoted to other uses.  Landowners may influence local policy through lobbying, 
campaign contributions, or bribes, acting, in effect, as agents for the households from 
whom they collect rent.  Renters may not vote or otherwise participate actively in the 
local political process and have little incentive to do so; nevertheless, their interests may 
be well-represented in the local political process. Indeed, localities whose policies are, in  10
effect, chosen by profit-maximizing landowners may produce fully-efficient outcomes in 
which levels of public-good provision satisfy the Samuelson condition. 
 
As a variation on this model, residents could be homeowners rather than renters.  
Homeowners, too, might seek to maximize property values, if they are freely mobile.  
Homeownership may, however, raise the costs of moving, tying homeowners to the 
locality  so that their personal preferences for local policy play a larger  role and concern 
for property values diminishes.  Of all the groups who exercise voice, however, none can 
impose burdens on the owners of freely mobile resources.     
 
 
As a cautionary note, it should be remembered that resources that are relatively mobile in 
one context may be less so in a different context.  Households newly arriving in a major 
metropolitan area can easily choose one locality over another in that area, almost at zero 
cost; the assumption that they can choose freely among them may be very plausible.  The 
proportion of people who can easily relocate among much larger jurisdictions (like states, 
provinces, or countries) is normally much smaller, however.  For such jurisdictions, it 
might be more appropriate (at least in the “short run”) to assume that households are 
immobile rather than freely mobile.  Even at the scale of larger jurisdictions, simple 
generalizations about the mobility of “labor” as a whole may be misleading, since 
mobility often differs by age, education, or other demographic types. In recent US 
experience, young and more highly educated people relocate relatively frequently than 
those who are older and less educated, but this does not mean that such people are always 
intrinsically more mobile.  For instance, black Americans exhibited a considerable degree 
of mobility during the period approximately 1915--1950 , which saw a substantial 
movement of low-skilled and poorly-educated workers from the rural South into the 
industrial cities of the North, Midwest, and West.  Observed flows of migration or capital 
are not necessarily good indicators of the degree of resource mobility.     
 
4 Resource Mobility: The Importance of Dynamics   
 
The theory of international trade conventionally draws a sharp distinction between 
“traded” and “non-traded” goods and services.  Similarly, as noted earlier, much of the 
theoretical and empirical literature on fiscal competition sharply distinguished “mobile” 
and “immobile” resources.  In neither case, however, can we be assured that reality falls 
neatly into line with these convenient distinctions.  In particular, observed trade patterns 
do not necessarily determine whether or to what degree a commodity is tradable, nor do 
flows of labor and capital among jurisdictions necessarily reveal the degree of factor 
mobility. In the simplest trade models, identical countries or regions will not trade simply 
because there is no incentive to do so, even if commodities can be transported across 
boundaries at zero cost. The same is true for factor mobility.  Even if labor or capital is 
freely mobile among jurisdictions, there may be no differences in (net) rates of return and 
thus no incentive for resources to move. In Figure 1, the final equilibrium is indeed one in 
which net rates of return for capital or other mobile resources are equalized among 
jurisdictions; if and when such an equilibrium is reached, no further factor flows would 
be observed.   
 
In general, then, how is one to determine which resources are mobile, and which are 
immobile?  As the preceding discussion has made clear, this is a fundamental question 
for the analysis of fiscal competition.  Building on the classical distinction between “short 
run” and “long run”, it is reasonable to argue that the “degree” to which a resource is 
mobile depends critically on the time horizon over which mobility is to be assessed, and 
on the resource in question.  For instance, modern technologies and the development of  11
                                                
modern financial markets makes it possible for financial capital to shift very rapidly 
within regions of a country as well as among countries. From the viewpoint of most 
aspects of fiscal policymaking, which occurs as a result of relatively slow-moving 
legislative or institutional change, a resource that can flow across jurisdictional 
boundaries within less than a year presumably qualifies as “mobile”.   
 
Far less mobile are the labor and capital, public and private, that constitute large urban 
agglomerations.  These entities, though continuously evolving, grow or decline over 
decades or centuries. The slow pace of this process reflects the costs of adjustment both 
of stocks of real capital assets like factories, office buildings, apartment buildings, or 
houses, and of population and labor forces. For example, the growth of major modern 
cities -- any of the largest 100 cities in the world, for example -- can usually be traced to 
protracted periods of investment in real capital as well as inflows of population from 
other (often rural) areas.  The size of a city's residential and nonresidential capital stocks, 
population, and labor force certainly may and sometimes does decline over time, but 
sudden large scale abandonment of existing stocks of real capital assets is rarely if ever 
observed.  Annual growth or decline of populations and capital stock in the range of 2--
10% are not uncommon, however, and faster rates of change are certainly feasible.   
 
Labor and capital are mobile on the largest geographic scales, as well, but, generally, 
over longer time horizons than is true for small geographical units.  International 
migration and international flows of capital have played an important role in the 
economic and political development of the Western hemisphere, as is well illustrated by 
the work of Williamson (1998) and co-authors, who examine the simultaneous 
determination of capital and labor flows and wage and rate-of-return differentials 
between the Old and New Worlds during the nineteenth century.  Of course, different 
types of labor and capital may be more or less mobile, to a degree that depends on 
information, transportation costs, the organization of markets, and other factors.  For 
instance, world-class athletes, musicians, and other entertainers now commonly provide 
their services in more than one country, and perhaps in many different countries, in a 
single year. The same is true of world-class authors, scientists, entrepreneurs, and 
managers. These and other high-income people, or at least the taxable income streams 
that accrue to them, can probably relocate on a global basis with comparative ease. 
5
 
The above considerations suggest that the degree of factor mobility may be usefully 
characterized, operationally, by the speed with which factor movements occur.  The 
geographic scope over which resources are mobile is likely to be rather small over very 
short time horizons, whereas mobility on a global scale is much less costly over long time 
horizons.  In this perspective, polar extreme assumptions about “mobile” and “immobile” 
resources presumably bracket, but only imperfectly, most of the empirically-relevant 
cases of resources that are “partially” mobile.   
 
In a dynamic setting, many of the basic implications of Section 2's benchmark model 
continue to hold, but in qualified form.  Mindful of Keynes' observation that “in the long 
run we are all dead”, we must note that participants in the political process care not only 
the long-run effects of policies but also their short-run effects.  In a world where 
economic agents discount the future, changes in incomes in the near term can be more 
important than long-run changes, even if the latter are larger in an undiscounted sense.  A 
 
5 The locational choices of such elite groups are of vital importance for the public policy, far out of 
proportion to their numbers.  In the US, less than 0.2% of taxpayers receive about 10% of taxable income 
in the US and pay about 20% of all personal income taxes.   
  12
policy of taxation of capital investment or of high-income households may, in the long 
run, lead to outflows of capital or of high-income households.  In the short run, however, 
it may be difficult for the owners of these taxed resources to escape the real burden of 
taxation.  A policy that uses taxes on capital or high-income households to finance 
transfers to poor immobile or elderly households may thus be advantageous to the latter 
in present-value terms, even it is harmful “in the long run.” Quasi-rents can be extracted 
from imperfectly mobile resources until the stock of these resources is gradually depleted 
sufficiently to raise their gross rate of return enough to equalize net rates of return with 
those available elsewhere.  In a simple model of fiscal competition similar to that of 
Section 2, the optimal net fiscal burden on an imperfectly mobile resource is inversely 
proportional to the “half life” of the dynamic adjustment process, i.e., very small, for a 
resource that adjusts very rapidly, but possibly very high for a resource that responds 
only sluggishly (Wildasin (2003)).   
 
Section 3's discussion of the political economy of fiscal competition can be reinterpreted 
in the context of dynamic factor mobility. Resources that are very mobile, such as highly 
liquid financial assets not subject to regulatory controls, earn very small quasi-rents.  
Those who can influence fiscal policy will not view these resources as very good fiscal 
policy “targets”: the modest gains from imposing significant fiscal burdens on them 
would be outweighed by the deadweight losses that ensue.   Direct participation in the 
political process is unprofitable for the owners of such resources.  Fixed capital 
investments or human resources, though perhaps highly mobile in the long term, adjust 
somewhat less rapidly to changes in policy. Favorable fiscal policies can produce positive 
changes in their incomes, in present value terms, and adverse policies may harm them. 
Their owners have diminished “exit” or “entry” options and thus have a greater incentive 
to use “voice” -- voting, lobbying, campaign financing -- to affect fiscal policy.   
 
These observations suggest that the time dimension of fiscal competition is of crucial 
importance, both because the speed with which resource stocks can adjust determines the 
degree of resource mobility and because policy-setting may involve tradeoffs between 
short-run and long-run effects.  This also implies that the problem of time-consistency 
and credibility policymaking is likely to play a critical role both in the economic analysis 
of fiscal competition and in the analysis of its implications for political economy.   
 
Indeed, the problem of time consistency and commitment is already well-recognized in 
the literature (Kydland and Prescott (1977)).  A now-classical problem in public finance 
concerns the means by which a government can commit itself not to expropriate capital 
investments either directly, or, indirectly, through confiscatory taxation.  A capital owner 
must incur the up-front costs of investment before a stream of returns can materialize, 
and these returns may be subject to taxation in future periods after the cost of investment 
is sunk. Today's incentive to invest depends on the expected tax treatment of the returns 
to capital investments in the future; the expectation of high tax burdens in the future 
would discourage investment in the present.  To commit credibly not to tax capital 
heavily in the future is difficult because, when revenues are needed at future dates, the 
government will face the tradeoff between taxing other revenue sources, such as earnings, 
or taxing the by-then historically-determined stock of capital.  A future tax on earnings or 
consumption would impose efficiency costs on the economy through distortions of 
behavior whereas a tax on the historically-given stock of capital would not do so.  
Rational investors anticipate this problem and today's incentives to save and invest are 
harmed accordingly.   
 
Kehoe (1989) explains how capital mobility can help to “solve” the problem of time 
consistent taxation if capital is sufficiently mobile that it cannot be “trapped” in a high- 13
tax jurisdiction. Specifically, Kehoe assumes that tax policies must be set prior to the 
decision about where to locate capital. In this case, fiscal competition prevents 
governments from capital expropriation.  Other means by which governments can 
effectively “commit” to limited ex post taxation include up-front subsidies, investments 
in public infrastructure, or other special incentives that offset anticipated future increases 
in taxation (see, e.g., Keen and Marchand (1997)), the development of reputation, and, of 
course, through constitutional constraints.  These might include many forms of limits on 
governmental powers
   (e.g., enumeration of powers, due process, separation of powers) 
so as to constrain future demands for revenue or the capacity of government to collect it.  
It should be noted, however, that some commitment mechanisms might shift the balance 
of taxation toward rather than away from durable assets.  For example, the establishment 
of an unfunded social security (public pension) system defers taxation to future periods 
and thus can undermine incentives for savings and investment.   
 
5  Competition and Institutional Change   
 
Fiscal competition has significant implications for the organization of the public sector.  
In particular, jurisdictions with limited geographic scope (like the governments of small 
municipalities) are, in general, likely to face greater competitive pressures than larger 
ones (like large countries).  While competition may limit the ability of small jurisdictions 
to redistribute income, it does not limit the underlying desire or demand for redistributive 
transfers.  If interest groups or their representatives are unsuccessful at pursuing 
redistributive transfers at one level of government, they may move the locus of 
redistributive politics to a higher level of government at which such transfers may be 
more effective.  Indeed, in his classic 1957 discussion, Stigler argued that the 
redistributive functions of government should be shifted to higher levels of government -- 
in the US context, to the national government, away from local governments -- precisely 
because of competitive pressures at the local level.   
 
Normative arguments aside, it is empirically true that a great deal of the redistributive 
activities of the public sector do occur at the level of national governments rather than at 
the subnational level. In the US, welfare programs like Aid to Families with Dependent 
Children/Temporary Assistance to Needy Families and Medicaid, though implemented 
by state governments, have traditionally been generously supported by fiscal transfers 
(especially by open-ended matching grants) from the national government.  Since World 
War II, state governments have taken a prominent role in local school finance, providing 
fiscal transfers to local governments in order to achieve greater uniformity of 
expenditures on elementary and secondary education -- another instance in which higher-
level governments pursue redistributive objectives that lower-level governments shun.   
 
By providing insight into the comparative advantage of different levels of government in 
the redistributive activities of the public sector, the theory of fiscal competition can shed 
light on the organization of a federal system and thus into the institutions of the public 
sector.  These evolve over time, and a topic worthy of further research concerns the 
relationship between institutional structures and changes in the degree of factor mobility 
over time.  For example, the shifting balance of school financing away from local and 
toward state governments may be attributable, in part, to the increased stratification of 
metropolitan areas arising from increased mobility of households at the local level since 
the widespread introduction of automobiles and other forms of low-cost local 
transportation, and concomitant limits on the ability of local governments to finance 
relatively uniform levels of education to poor households by taxation of higher-income 
households. Over long historical periods, the mobility of labor and capital falls due to 
technological progress and it may also fall, sometimes rapidly, due to political change.   14
                                                
These (possibly) exogenous changes provide a basis for an exploration of the effects of 
factor mobility on the institutions through which redistributive policies are implemented. 
As a broad working hypothesis, “upward reassignment” of redistributive functions over 
time would be anticipated. If no effective higher level of government is available to carry 
out redistributive functions, pressures may arise to bring new, higher-level governments 
into existence or to add new responsibilities to existing institutions.  Recent debates and 
referenda concerning the EU constitution can be interpreted, at least partially, in this 
light.  
 
 6  Conclusion   
 
The preceding discussion has shown how the economic impacts of fiscal policies depend 
on the mobility of the resources to which these policies are applied.  Competition for 
resources changes the constraints under which governments operate, and the payoffs -- to 
resident and non-resident households, the owners of firms, politicians, and political 
parties -- from alternative fiscal policies.  In this way, it affects the political economy of 
policymaking.  Of course, it goes without saying that the political economy of 
policymaking is influenced by a host of other considerations, most notably the political 
institutions (dictatorships, parliamentary or “presidential” democracies ), transparent or 
corrupt systems, etc.) through which policies are made.
6  In emphasizing the importance 
of resource mobility, I have focused on the constraints under which policies are made 
rather than on the mechanisms through which policies are made, but both are clearly 
important (and, as suggested in Section 5, interdependent). 
 
Despite the considerable attention that it has recently received, there is much scope for 
fruitful additional analysis of fiscal competition.  Clarifying the nature of “resource 
mobility” (perhaps through dynamic modeling, as suggested in Section 4) seems to be of 
fundamental importance.  At present, conflicting and inconsistent assumptions about 
resource mobility are commonplace in both theoretical and empirical research.  Perhaps 
the most challenging task on the research horizon is to investigate the nature of 
institutional change in a competitive environment.  We live in a world in which the 
mobility of labor and capital appear to be increasing over time, in part due to secular 
trends (ever-falling transportation and communication costs, in particular), in part due to 
momentous political upheavals (especially the collapse of the Soviet Union and its 
satellite systems), and in part due to the liberalization of economic policies throughout 
the world (EU expansion, economic reforms in countries large and small). Students of 
institutional change are in the enviable position of being able to watch these events as 
they unfold.  If successful in their efforts, they may succeed in better understanding 
ongoing institutional evolution; they may even, in a modest way, help in the fashioning of 
new institutions and the policies that emerge from them.   
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